With the growing acceptance of the Internet as a new dissemination medium, several new and interesting challenges arise in building a digital commerce infrastructure. In this article we discuss some of the issues that arise in building such an infrastructure. In particular, we study how one can nd and pay for digital information, and how one can safeguard the information from invalid access and duplication. We use examples from our Stanford Digital Library Project to illustrate some of these problems and their potential solutions.
Introduction
As the the Internet population has expanded beyond the scienti c research community, businesses have recognized the potential of electronic commerce. The Internet makes large number of customers available, and electronic commerce could reduce the costs of business-to-business sales by eliminating much o f the paperwork and bureaucracy. On the other hand, customers also like the appeal of electronic commerce, with many more products available and the possibility of easily shopping for the lowest prices.
However, the infrastructure for e-commerce has lagged behind the interest of buyers and sellers. On the one hand, there needs to be widespread availability of client software for the individual customers to nd, purchase, and receive the desired goods over the network. On the other hand, server software for merchants needs to automate both front o ce" activities of presenting the goods and taking orders, and the back o ce" activities of processing payments, and integrating with accounting, inventory and order fulllment systems. Furthermore, when it comes to electronic goods documents, music, movies, safeguarding mechanisms are needed, making it hard for users to access the goods without paying or for them to make illegal copies.
In this paper we discuss some of the issues involved and potential solutions for electronic commerce, focusing on the infrastructure for nding, paying, delivering, and safeguarding electronic goods or information. In addition, we highlight some of the work in this area that has been carried out as part of the Stanford Digital Library Project.
We start by describing the main components of an electronic commerce system, i.e., ordering, payment and delivery systems. Then in Section 3 we discuss how these components can be combined into complete solutions. Within each solution, some of the significant providers and tools will be presented. In Sections 4 and 5 we describe Stanford research projects in this area, mainly the Universal Payment Application Interface U-PAI and the Shopping Model Architecture. We focus in more detail on the content delivery problem in Section 6, discussing how information can be protected, how illegal copies can be detected, and how illegal copies can be traced back to the original copy they were made from. In Section 7 we then overview the Stanford Copyright Analysis Mechanism SCAM, which provides e cient copy detection.
E-Commerce Components
Customers using e-commerce applications typically begin their shopping transaction by searching for a product that they want, or browsing through an electronic storefront or catalog. They may view descriptions or pictures of goods, ultimately selecting some for purchase. Following their selection, they must be able to pay for their goods, and, in the event that the goods are digital, receive and use the goods. These steps of placing an order, paying for the order, and receiving a delivery correspond to the main services required of e-commerce client software. The merchant needs to have server software that supports the dissemination of product information and collection of orders; the processing of customer payments; and the delivery of goods. These processes will be described in turn in the following subsections.
Ordering Systems
Given the diversity of end-user systems in widespread use, creating a special purpose application to connect a user to an electronic storefront i s b e y ond the resources of most merchants. Fortunately, i t i s n o t necessary. The existing infrastructure of web browsers provides a reasonably sophisticated platform for the presentation of goods. General purpose browsers permit the display of textual and graphic information and simple animation in a consistent format to almost all users regardless of their personal system. More engaging information, such as audio, full video and applets" may be presented to consumers at the higher end of the technical spectrum.
Since each merchant has its own electronic storefront and process for selecting goods and placing orders, there had been little standardization of this process. As long as the majority of transactions are between an end-user and a single merchant's system, the gains of standardization and interoperation are limited. In the future though, as intelligent agents" act on behalf of shoppers, a programmatic interface to the ordering system will provide greater value. The BargainFinder agent 18 required hand-coded modications to interact with each new CD store to nd the lowest price for a piece of music. Jango 21 , by Netbot, Inc., partially automates the process of creating adaptors" to interact with di erent stores.
Payment Systems
The nancial infrastructure for the open network environment w as a largely academic concern until the early 1990's. A proposal for digital cash 4 existed in the 1980's, but was not implemented for ordinary use. The widening audience of the Internet and speci cally the World Wide Web showed a great deal of commercial promise, and the lack o f a p a yment mechanism became an obvious business opportunity. The rush to create a practical system was on, and the mid-1990's saw the launch of systems such as First Virtual 38 , CyberCash 5 , e-cash from DigiCash 7 and the Secure Electronic Transaction SET protocol from Mastercard and Visa 29 . These systems shared the goal of moving money between accounts, but varied widely in their methods. Some are credit-based, others debitbased, some rely on cryptography to provide security, others forgo it. They use a diversity of communication protocols ranging from secure versions of HTTP to email. Some provide a wallet" user interface, others do not. Comparisons between the systems have been published elsewhere 27 . The interested reader is referred to the original papers for the technical details of the protocols and to these comparison papers for the feature sets and other considerations to be used in choosing among them.
Given all these schemes, the merchant had the option of selecting among several payment systems providers. The reality, h o w ever, is that none of the systems had a signi cant user base, and transactions were small in number and value. Sending credit card information in plain text, across an encrypted socket, or out-of-band were the preferred methods for customers to pay for goods they ordered on line.
Delivery Systems
For many information goods, the network became not only a convenient w a y to nd goods and place and pay for an order, but also a fast, e cient w a y to deliver the goods to the purchaser. However, retailers were concerned about their intellectual property assets, recognizing that a perfect digital copy could be made by a n e a v esdropper or buyer and re-distributed easily without the appropriate fees being paid to the author or publisher of the information. Section 6 describes the issues involved in content delivery.
Combining Components
The components described in the previous sections are largely stand alone services. A merchant can receive a p a yment with First Virtual, or send a document with a secure delivery service. Tying these two activities together, or presenting the goods for immediate purchase are beyond the scope of any of these components individually.
In order to ll this void, a number of companies, both new and established, are o ering solutions to the merchant wishing to enter the e-commerce world. The solutions fall into three types: buy", build", or rent". First, merchants can buy and operate a complete commerce server. Second, they can build their own system by combining the components themselves. Third, they can employ a service provider to manage the e-commerce system, essentially outsourcing the data processing requirements while focusing on the content generation. These three solution styles are described in the following subsections.
3.1 Commerce servers: The Buy" Approach
Web servers were designed to facilitate the sharing of information, using relatively simple protocols that would be easy to implement o n a n umber of platforms. These systems were not intended for e-commerce however. The goal of widespread dissemination of scienti c information was incompatible with the practice of charging for information or goods.
In order to accept payments for subscriptions or individual content items, the main developers of web servers extended their products into the arena of commerce servers", with the Netscape Enterprise Server 22 and Microsoft's Merchant Server 19 . Oracle saw an opportunity t o l e v erage their database business into this area as well 24 . Startup companies such as iCat 14 focused on the niche, exhibiting strength in areas such as producing a catalog from a database. NetBill 36 , a research project at Carnegie Mellon University, links the payment with the delivery of electronic goods, providing guarantees about a fair exchange.
These products provide merchants with a complete solution, though of limited exibility. T ypically, the servers accept payment via encrypted credit cards and deliver goods via HTTP or provide an entry into the merchant's existing ful llment process for physical goods. Support for other payment protocols and delivery mechanisms is limited, frequently requiring signi cant development e ort on behalf of the merchant.
Universal Protocol: The Build" Approach
Recognizing the need to integrate these diverse components into more complete services, a number of industry consortia have proposed the creation of universal interfaces or protocols so that a developer could call upon any one of a number of external services without having to tailor the application to a novel interface each time. Similarly, b y providing support for the universal interface, other developers could make use of the application more easily. Examples in this category include Java's JECF 39 , SEMPER 28 , eCo 40 , and the Open Trading Protocol 20 .
Outsourcing: The Rent" Approach
For smaller merchants especially, the prospect of running a commerce server or developing their own e-commerce applications is daunting. They wish to reach customers in cyberspace without building or buying all of the support systems for handling electronic commerce. To serve these rms, a number of providers have o ered to outsource e-commerce services. For example, AT&T o ers SecureBuy 2 , using the Open Market Transact system 23 to provide the back o ce functions, where merchants can permit AT&T to handle all of the system installation and administration, while they ful ll the orders.
Payment Mechanism Independence
As discussed in Section 3.2, universal interfaces to e-commerce components are highly desirable. In this section we brie y describe one protocol developed at Stanford, that tries to isolate payment clients from the diversity and complexity o f p a yment mechanisms. The U-PAI Universal Payment Application Interface system and SEMPER's Generic Payment System 1 provides a standardized payment i n terface to payment mechanisms. A layer of proxies, which can be implemented by the payment mechanism provider or a third party, translate between the mechanism's native i n terface and that speci ed by U-PAI. Therefore, neither the customer's nor the merchant's application code needs to be changed when a new payment mechanism is introduced. The calls to the U-PAI interface that enabled interaction with the old payment mechanisms work for the new one as well.
De ning an appropriate interface requires including the appropriate amount of functionality. If important functions are excluded, application developers will be forced to go outside the standard, and the bene ts of the standard are largely nulli ed. If too much functionality is included, the implementation of the standard becomes di cult or impossible, decreasing its chances of adoption.
An important feature of the U-PAI system is that all of its remote calls are asynchronous and nonblocking, with a callback used to return the result of the remote computation. This feature adds robustness if the remote service is unavailable, and also permits a user to attempt to abort a payment that is in progress. Figure 1 shows the steps involved in using the U-PAI protocol in conjunction with the e-cash system from DigiCash. Steps A through D are de ned by the U-PAI system, and are independent of the details of the e-cash protocol. The steps numbered 0 through 6 are those particular to e-cash. The customer application creates a Payment Control Record PCR complete with information about the source and destination account, and amount of the transfer. When the startTransfer method is invoked and repeated to the accountHandle proxy representing the payment mechanism, the native protocol e-cash, in this case is initiated. That protocol proceeds until complete or a signi cant c heckpoint is reached when the disposition of the transaction is sent to the accountHandle which sends it back t o t h e PCR and from there to any Monitor that needs to be apprised of the transaction's progress. The merchant m a y be one such monitor, delivering the goods if the payment w as successful. Note that the customer and merchant's applications and monitors are completely insulated from the details of the payment mechanism, and could use any other payment mechanism with the appropriate U-PAI interface accountHandle proxies. For more detail on the U-PAI system, consult 17 .
Shopping Model Architecture
Payment mechanism independence is a good rst step to an interoperable system. However, as described above, payment is only one component o f a n e-commerce application. While equivalent techniques could be used to permit interoperation for delivery systems or ordering systems, a whole di erent plane of exibility i s a c hieved by controlling the sequencing among these operations. For example, an annual subscription to a weekly magazine may be implemented as an order and a payment, followed by 52 deliveries. Some merchants may permit goods to be delivered before receiving payment, while others insist on payment rst. Sessions can be represented as a numb e r o f o rders followed by deliveries, with an aggregated payment at the end of the session. These are examples of shopping models 16 . The goal of the Shopping Model Architecture is to permit a customer and merchant t o select a shopping model that they agree upon, perhaps one that was not even proposed at the time their applications were developed, and carry out the transaction according to that shopping model.
A Shopping Controller is an object which implements a particular shopping model, that is, a sequencing among the ordering, payment, and delivery actions. Instead of directly communicating with each other, the merchant and customer send their messages to the ShoppingController, which determines the correct next step" for the transaction, and makes the appropriate call upon the relevant participant. The ShoppingController also acts as a Monitor in the U-PAI sense for the payment and delivery actions between the merchant and customer, and is able to advance the transaction based on the outcome of them.
For example, in Figure 2 , a fragment of a transaction is shown, beginning with the merchant's receipt of a complete order. The merchant acknowledges the order Message 1 by contacting the ShoppingController. This controller happens to implement a P a y First, Deliver Later" model, so it instructs the customer to pay b y sending a bill Message 2. The customer invokes U-PAI to transfer money to the merchant's account Message 3. The ShoppingController is a Monitor to the U-PAI transfer, so when the transfer completes successfully, the controller is noti ed Message 4. In the completion of the example, the controller would contact the merchant, which w ould send the goods via a delivery protocol similar to U-PAI.
If the ShoppingController were a Deliver First, Pay Later" model, the rst message indicating that the merchant had received a complete order would re- 
Content Delivery
Once a customer has bought some goods and paid for them, the merchant has to deliver the content in case of digital content, the merchant m a y use some protocol such as HTTP or e-mail to deliver the goods. However when the provider uses digital means of transmission, he runs the risk of the content being copied and made available to the entire world through the World Wide Web. In such a case, the provider will be paid only once, i.e., for the rst copy, while most people will access the content from the alternate web ftp source. Hence many book publishers, photographers and movie makers are facing a dilemma regarding the digital availability o f v aluable content. On the one hand, they would like to use the web for 1 tapping into the impulsive buyer" market who relish immediate access to required information, and for 2 making higher pro ts due to lower delivery costs. On the other hand, they will lose revenues due to illegal copies. As a compromise solution to this quandary, book publishers are beginning to o er a few pages of popular novels as a teaser" on the web, while selling physical copies of the books to the reader.
A related problem arises due to the growing popularity of the web as a dissemination medium. Until recently making an illegal copy of a best-selling book and distributing it widely was very hard for two reasons: 1 the physical act of photo-copying or printing books was time-consuming, and 2 the distribution channels available to the law-breakers were limited. However today a n y small-time operator with good scanning and OCR technology can reproduce books and make them available on the web, usenet newsgroups or public mailing lists at little cost. Professional photographers and art collectors also face similar problems when images in their portfolios are made freely available to the world.
Protecting digital documents from illegal copying has received a lot of attention recently, both in terms of revised intellectual property l a ws, as well as new technology-based solutions 26, 11 . For an excellent discussion of issues involved in intellectual property, from a legal perspective refer to 10 . We n o w outline some of the technology-based solutions currently being developed as research prototypes or available as commercial products in the following subsections.
Copy Protection
In the copy protection approach, content providers use a variety of techniques to make i t v ery hard to make copies. One common approach i s t o p h ysically isolate information by placing the information on stand-alone CD-ROM systems, and by letting users access data through some search i n terface. Another approach is to use special-purpose hardware for authorization 25 , or to build fully trusted systems" using fully trusted components" and secure interconnections 37 .
The software industry, when faced with software piracy, adopted a very rigorous policy of disallowing making disk copies of software. However this policy led to a decline in sales since end users could no longer make backup copies of software to recover from crashes the software companies withdrew this policy in the mid-1980's. Since then the software industry has tried a v ariety o f s c hemes to reduce software piracy, but these measures always end up falling short of hackers.
Recently IBM introduced Cryptolopes The approach adopted by Cryptolopes and DigiBoxes however has the following drawbacks: 1 it requires a user's favorite viewer such as emacs, vi, Microsoft Word to be cryptolope-compatible," 2 hackers can still write software emulators or screen capturing software to obtain a copy of the data once they have paid for the content, 3 it does not solve the problem of a person scanning an image from a physical copy o f t h e magazine or OCRing its textual content, and o ering it on a web site.
Watermarks
In the watermarking approach, the content provider uses steganographic techniques to hide additional information into digital content. For instance when an image is sold to a customer, the image could be imperceptibly marked with the user's credit card number. Once the illegal version of some content is found on a public web site using techniques presented in the next subsection the content provider can then track the original buyer by extracting the watermarks.
Currently there is signi cant research in adding imperceptible, hard-to-remove" watermarks to digital content, especially for images and audio 13 . There are also commercial products from Dice 6 t o w atermark audio, as well as from Digimarc 8 t o w atermark and track images on the web. However, current techniques are not completely resilient t o h a c k ers in fact hackers may view the problem of breaking the watermarking scheme as a challenge to their hacking skills. Also the watermarking approach does not address the problem of a person scanning an image from a physical copy of the magazine, and making it publicly available.
Copy Detection
In the copy detection approach, the content provider imposes few restrictions on how content i s distributed. However, the content provider nds illegal exact copies and partial copies e.g., chapters or sections of books of text and images on the World Wide Web i.e., web sites, newsgroups, mailing lists. by k eeping track of who he sells objects to, and who possesses illegal copies. An important and challenging problem in this context is how to automatically nd illegal copies of content such as text, images and videos especially as the numb e r o f w eb sites, newsgroups and mailing lists increases. For this, we can build a Copy Detection System CDS using the following components:
1. Crawler: The crawler crawls through the World Wide Web and presents a stream of documents and images to the CDS. 2. Registration Repository: This is a database of objects such as books and images registered by book publishers and photographers who want to nd illegal copies of their works. 3. Similarity Matcher: When the crawler presents a query object, we need to e ciently compare the object to objects in the repository. If the query object is a close-enough" match to some object in the repository, w e notify the owner of the registered object of the potential illegal copy. For example, if Walt Disney Corporation wants to nd all images of Mickey Mouse available on the World Wide Web, they would register images of Mickey Mouse into the registration repository of the CDS. When the similarity matcher gets an image from the crawler, it nds all images in the repository that are close enough" to the input image. If the query image is an image of Mickey Mouse, the similarity matcher should nd the corresponding registered images and notify Disney Corporation.
There are many c hallenges in building an ideal CDS. The ideal CDS should be:
1. Accurate: Given a query object, the similarity matcher should return the set of objects that are close to the query object according to some similarity measure. That is, the good CDS will have high precision and recall using standard terminology from the Information Retrieval community. 2. Scalable: The repository and similarity matcher should scale as the number of registered and crawled objects increases. 3. Resilient: The similarity matcher should be resilient t o a n y tampering by a n a d v ersary who can guess" how the CDS detects copies. For instance, an illegal copy of a text document m o di ed by adding some words or by c hanging the format e.g., Word versus HTML or Postscript should still be detected as a copy. An illegal copy of an image modi ed by operations such as cropping, dithering, blurring should still be detected as illegal. Building such an ideal CDS is technologically difcult in the near future. Today, w e can build an efcient CDS that may be inaccurate and not resilient to tampering. For example, we can compute checksums for every registered object and store these checksums into a database. For each query object, we can then compute the corresponding checksum and nd objects with the same checksum e ciently. H o w ever this scheme cannot handle partial matches and may be broken by the insertion of even a single word into an illegal document, or by cropping an image. Alternately we can build a CDS which performs tests with high precision, recall and resiliency but is not scalable. For example to nd illegal partial textual overlap, we can compare every registered document against all known documents, looking at the common maximal subsequences of characters. Documents that share many long subsequences would be considered potential copies. While this may be more accurate and resilient t o s e v eral forms of tampering such a s inserting words into the text randomly, computing maximal subsequences is expensive, and the scheme does not scale well as the number of query documents and registered documents increases. In Section 7 we present a copy detection scheme that is more e cient, although perhaps less accurate and resilient.
Observe that copy detection systems are also an important component of the watermarking schemes: we need to rst nd illegal partial and exact copies on the web using a CDS, before watermarks can be extracted to identify the original buyer. In some cases the role of the CDS may be simpli ed, especially if all partial copies of the content still retain the watermarking information.
Overview of Stanford Copy Analysis
Mechanism SCAM
We h a v e implemented an experimental prototype, the Stanford Copy Analysis Mechanism SCAM, as a proof-of-concept" CDS system for text documents. This system indexes Netnews articles and web documents and allows users to check for potential illegal copies of their documents. We h a v e developed a web interface to this system and have also integrated it into the Stanford Digital Library testbed. In the rest of this section we summarize some of the research challenges that were addressed as SCAM was implemented.
The reader may b e i n terested to know that we h a v e used the SCAM system to nd actual occurrences of academic plagiarism. In a renowned case, a graduate student had copied and partly modi ed technical reports of researchers in computer science and resubmitted them under his own name to di erent journals and conferences. When ACM was compiling a case against him, they had access only to his abstracts. But in order to compile the case, ACM needed to nd the set of original technical reports he had copied from. We used SCAM to track these initial technical reports using abstracts from INSPEC, a repository of abstracts of technical papers in computer science. The success of SCAM was reported in several mailing lists and newsgroups on the Internet, as well as magazines such a s Communications of the ACM, Forbes Magazine, The Recorder and the Intellectual Property Magazine.
Chunking
We believe one way t o a c hieve accuracy, scalability a s w ell as resiliency is to chunk an object into smaller primitives and to compute similarity measures using these chunks. For example, we can chunk registered text documents into sentences and store these sentences in a database. When a query document i s to be checked against the registered objects, we can chunk the query document i n to sentences and check the database for documents with the same sentences. We can then de ne a registered document t o b e a close enough" copy if it shares a su cient number of sentences with the query document. This form of chunking is accurate for nding documents that have sentence overlap, and is resilient to tampering unless a majority of sentences in the illegal document are modi ed. Such a CDS is also scalable if we build e cient data structures such a s i n v erted indices on sentences to nd registered documents containing a given sentence.
In 30, 31 we propose a variety o f c h unkings such as words, subsequences, sentences and hashed breakpoints 3 , similarity measures and data structures to compute similarity b e t w een textual documents. We also report a comprehensive e v aluation of these chunkings with respect to important performance measures such as space consumption, load time, probe time, and false positive and false negative errors on a large document set.
Often one needs to detect copies between a large set of registered documents, and a large set of potential copies. This can be done in batch" mode, as opposed to comparing each registered document against the potential copies, one at a time. This is analogous to a database join, where every document in one set has to be checked for potential overlap against all documents in the second set. In 32 w e present algorithms for e ciently comparing large batches of documents.
Filtering Expensive T ests
In general, there are many w a ys to check for overlap between documents. Some strategies may be accurate but expensive e.g., searching for maximal subsequences, while others may be more e cient but less accurate. Actually, tests could be less accurate in two ways: they can fail to detect documents that did overlap signi cantly false negatives, or they can indicate that two documents overlap when in reality they do not false positives. These tests can be composed to obtain tests that have better accuracy and performance characteristics. For example, say w e h a v e a test T 1 that is inexpensive but yields many false positives, and a test T 2 that is more expensive but has many fewer false positives. Then, to test a document, we can rst run T 1 . If the test is positive, then we can run T 2 to con rm the result.
In 34 w e propose a general framework for expressing tests in terms of their expenses, errors and selectivity. W e show h o w to compose tests using di erent operators, and present provably good algorithms for choosing the right set of tests to use, in order to reduce costs and errors. This framework is applicable beyond SCAM, and we h a v e considered how it can be applied in other fuzzy" matching applications such as in IBM's Query By Image Content QBIC image searching engine.
Selecting Text Databases and Extracting Documents
So far we h a v e assumed that SCAM collects all" documents for comparison against registered documents. This is ne if the potential copies are freely available, but is not feasible if the potential copies are hidden" behind search engines, or if we cannot afford to collect all potential copies. For instance, say we are given a document d that may h a v e a copy a t one of several databases B 1 ; :::; B n . Each B i provides a traditional text search i n terface, but is incapable of running a copy detection algorithm for us.
A rst challenge is to discover which o f t h e B i databases are good candidates for ner testing. One possible scheme is to generate a detection query based on important w ords in d, or perhaps using all words in d. W e can then submit the detection query to each database; if the number of documents in the answer is high we can consider that database a good candidate for further exploration. Another possibility i s t o rely on statistics about each B i e.g., how frequently each w ords appears to discover good databases. This approach is similar to that used by GlOSS 12 .
Once we h a v e identi ed B i as a candidate, a second challenge is to extract from it documents that may b e copies. For this, we can generate an extraction query, submit it to B i , and then use SCAM to compare the returned documents with d.
In 9 we h a v e studied these problems in detail. We proposed schemes for detecting good candidate databases based on statistical information, as well as strategies for constructing good extraction queries. Our experimental results show that these combined ideas can be very useful for copy detection when SCAM cannot analyze all documents.
Indexing Data Windows
In many cases, authors and photographers are interested in checking if their work has been copied in a certain past time period, for example, the past week. This and several other applications in databases motivate the construction of indices that can e ciently index data of a past window o f d a ys. For example, if we wish to maintain an index on data of the past 7 days, an interesting question is how to e ciently add a new day's 8 th day data and quickly expire data of the 1 st day. A n o b vious way is to maintain a single index and delete entries of the 1 st day, and add entries of the 8 th day to the index. However in 33 we propose a family of wave indices, which are alternate ways of organizing indices that are optimized for maintaining windows of data. We also show using examples from SCAM, Altavista and a Data Warehousing benchmark how di erent w a v e indices may make indexing windows of data more e cient.
